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The particular location of port infrastructure holds characteristics that determine the
activity of the port, both with respect to traffic and with respect to implementing
competitive strategies; and the efficiency and efficacy of infrastructure depend on
the governance systems that regulate the ports. Likewise, the development of port
activity echoes in the regional economy as well, hence governance becomes integral
to maximizing the impact of ports on their region’s economic development.
However, the activity of a port transcends the domestic/regional frontiers, as long as
the port intends to take part in a global supply chain. Achieving this aim poses a
challenge on the authorities that govern port activity, and this challenge needs to be
seized when it comes to adjusting the governance to external and internal goals.
In the specific case of the analysed ports, the prevailing governance model is known
as Landlord, which differs noticeably from port to port. These differences make it
possible to distinguish the orientation of European ports from that of the analysed
Latin American ports, showing a dissimilar adjustment of the conception of
governance that followed objectives that were not simultaneous. The paper draws
forth a questioning of the uniqueness of the denomination Landlord and its
legitimacy given the new challenges. Furthermore, the paper opens the way to
understanding the need to adapt governance to changes, given the examined
experiences. The analysis covers the following cases: Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, France, Italy, Portugal and Spain.
Keywords: Governance, Port system, Ports, Latin America, EuropeIntroduction
In general terms, a governance model is derived from a sequence of circumstances.
Therefore, it is able to evolve on time and to face new challenges by reforming itself.
Each reform configures a new governance model, as Fig. 1 shows. Originally crafted by
Brooks and Cullinane (2007), the Figure allows to explain many of the changes that
took place in European and Latin American ports when a wave of reforms first took
place in the 90s.
At the very beginning, changes on governance model could be related to market
changes, the establishment of new goals, the disposal of additional resources, a techno-
logical innovation or merely the saturation and inefficiency of the port facilities and
services.The Author(s). 2016 Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
icense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
rovided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and
ndicate if changes were made.
Fig. 1 The decision flows for port governance. Source: Sánchez and Pinto (2015) from Brooks and Cullinane
(2007). Note: grey boxes are from Brooks and Cullinane (2007)
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example: deepen changes happening in the market; traditional ports facing physical re-
strictions that require the construction of new facilities (greenfield ports); lessons to
learn from the reform process and new legal and regulatory instruments appearing; or
some objectives from the original reforms are being accomplished and new strategic
targets appear. The process to face any of these new challenges is not always simple.
This fact could cause the reform to follow an unexpected path or even to never take
place.
The aim of this paper is to compare how the changes experienced in port activity
have been reflected in the port governance reforms conducted in the Latin countries
both in South America and in Europe.
In South America, the chosen cases were Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Colombia. The
choice was based on two reasons: 1. The age of reforms; 2. The relevance in the total
quantity of containers operated in the region. Indeed, the four countries were pioneers
in Latin American port reforms (along with Mexico and Uruguay), and provided guidance
to other national reforms that occurred later. The 2013–2015 average participation of the
four countries on the total throughput of South America was 76% (CEPAL, 2015). The
cases in Southern Europe: France, Italy, Portugal and Spain, correspond to the definition
indicated on the paper as countries of “Latin origin” on both continents.
The object of work of this paper is the port governance. However, each port tends to
generate new governance structures in accordance with national regulations. Therefore,
there is a relationship between port reform and governance (as it is shown in Fig. 1)
and, in order to better understand the kind of governance that exists in each case, port
reforms must be analysed.
In this paper, the approach to port governance is general, considering the port au-
thority and the cluster as a whole in terms of governance.
To deal with the paper’s goal, firstly the governance concept is introduced and ana-
lysed from a literature review in "The port governance concept" section, specially
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and the European countries are shown in "Cases analysis" section. The analysis applied
in this section is mainly qualitative; data collection methods used for this section in-
clude literature review, legal documents revision and interviews to both public and pri-
vate port officials. Finally, "Discussion" and "Conclusions" sections respectively, present
the discussion and summarizes the main conclusions drawn as well as introduces the
pending points for further research in this field.
The port governance concept
The governance concept is usually understood as a governmental issue. However, this
concept goes beyond the public context, and can also be approached from the corpor-
ate and social perspective. According to Stoker (1998) cited in Lam et al. (2013)
“governance is a complex set of institutions and actors drawn from, and also beyond,
government. It identifies self-governing mechanisms of actors”. Similarly, Monios (2015)
argues that “official government institutions become only one part of the totality of the
governance process. Governance then becomes a broader process of distributing authority
and allocating resources, of managing relationships, behaviour or processes to achieve a
desired outcome.”
From the broader point of view, governance refers to the set of rules and structures
available for managing their own strategies; from the administration perspective,
governance refers to the set of rules and structures imposed on firms to influence their
decisions (Brooks and Cullinane 2007).
In any case, discussing governance means discussing how to provide the proper con-
text for the coordination of the stakeholders involved in an activity in order to
maximize their performance as a whole. “Ports are inclined to develop new governance
structures, which should be tailored to the specific local conditions in terms of culture
and port objectives” (Notteboom 2007, page 438).
According to Geiger (2011), cited in Borges Vieira et al. (2014), any model of govern-
ance must take into account three basic queries: who, what and how it governs. These
three points are directly related to the cornerstones of the governance: its structure, its
actions and its own elements. The structure refers to the regulatory framework; the ac-
tions, to the tools leading to coordination; and the elements, to the agents and flows.
Inside the framework of port governance, Talley (2009) highlighted that “Port govern-
ance refers to the ownership, management, and control of the operations of a port”;
that is, the author presents a perception of the port governance concept similar to that
of the World Bank (2007), which indicates what port governance refers to, but does
not clarify what it is that it implies. Considering other authors, we can distinguish two
levels: the port and the port authority. The first level refers to the socio-economic
agents and political bodies linked to a port; the second one, to port management as a
firm (Verhoeven and Vanoutrive 2012). In the latter, the governance process is defined
according to how the interaction between policy makers and the port authority takes
place: the greater the port authority autonomy, the greater its own responsibility in port
management performance (Brooks and Pallis 2008). “In seaports, a distinction needs to
be made between PA governance and port governance. The governance of the PA is
closely linked with corporate governance issues, such as shareholder influence, structure
of the board of governors and corporate social responsibility. Port governance, on the
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tors” (De Langen 2007, page 458). In the end, the port governance process lies in the
establishment of a set of rules compatible with both its trajectory and its future objec-
tives (Brooks 2004). Following González-Laxe (2013), cited in Sanchez and Pinto
(2015), the key elements for port governance in practice are the institutions, the mech-
anisms and the processes involved.
As the guide provided by the World Bank in 2007 (Port Reform Toolkit) states, there
are four basic models of port administration, although they can vary according to the
legal status of the corresponding port authority (Ferrari et al. 2015). These four models
are i) the Service Port, ii) the Tool Port, iii) the Landlord Port and iv) the Private
Service Port. They can be distinguished from each other depending on who provides
the port services and also who exerts the ownership and the management of the supra-
infrastructure: the public or the private sector (for a deeper understanding, see also
Brooks (2004), Brooks and Cullinane (2007) or Debrie et al. (2013)). The port model fi-
nally chosen depends on the socio-economic context, the location of facilities, the flows
of traffic and the historical development (that is, on how the port is organized, struc-
tured and managed). The degree of the private sector involvement also depends on the
development of the capital market and the country tradition regarding the transport
services provision. The governing authority (either at a national, regional or local level)
states the legal framework determining the model of port governance. Once the legal
framework has been set up, a supervising entity of the port authorities' actions must be
established. It can be dependent of either the central government or of minor public
administration levels. The configuration of this entity and the degree of autonomy it
confers to the port authorities are key in the port governance model definition, making
it possible to go beyond the World Bank classification (Sanchez and Pinto 2015).
Brooks and Cullinane (2007) identify five basic alternatives of port governance
depending on how the public and the private sectors share the ownership, the manage-
ment and the control of ports: i) central ownership, management and control; ii) cen-
tral ownership and local management and control; iii) public ownership and
management and control exerted by a corporation; iv) public ownership with private
management through a concession arrangement; and finally v) private ownership, man-
agement and control. The distribution of both the functions of the ports and their con-
trol mechanisms can vary by countries even for the same model. Nevertheless, it is
always assumed that the ownership and the assets control lie in the administration
when the port model is public, whereas a complete functions transfer from the public
sector is required for considering a port model as private.
The conception of port governance models evolves both in time and space because of
the confluence of several elements: i) devolution, ii) corporate governance, iii) oper-
ational profile, iv) functional autonomy, v) functional pro-activeness, vi) investment re-
sponsibility and (vii) financial autonomy (see Verhoeven and Vanoutrive 2012). This
evolution has intensified since the 1990s, in line with the devolution programs devel-
oped all around the world. Those reforms sought to increase the transparency, optimize
the resources and find new financial sources (Brooks 2004)1. Additional and relevant
changes for the port governance evolution are: i) the new paradigm of ports (nodes in-
stead of places); ii) the need for ports to be competitive, flexible and efficient, iii) the
internationalization of cargo handling firms, iv) the confluence of different port
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ports and a reduction of ties with the cities where they are located (Vanoutrive 2012).
It could be concluded that port governance models are influenced by the size of the
corresponding port authority (Verhoeven 2011), and evolve because of the socio-
economic framework and the performance of ports (Brooks and Pallis 2008).
Usually, reforms in port governance programmes are imposed by the government
looking for an improvement in efficiency, to face budget restrictions or merely for ideo-
logical reasons. However, those guidelines do not always lead to the expected result. It
is necessary to develop a suitable model of port governance (according to the context
and the objectives and challenges stated) in order to achieve the optimal outcome. Des-
pite this, it should be stressed that an entrepreneur context can be more determinant
for the port success than any formal model of port governance (when the port author-
ity enjoys a reasonable level of autonomy and the proper legal framework is clearly
stated)2 (Verhoeven 2009). The legitimacy of their acts will be assessed by their out-
comes according to their challenges (Vanoutrive 2012).
Indeed, the main objective of port governance is to boost the performance of the fa-
cilities through the establishment of a suitable management model3. That model must
serve to achieve the expected goals (the optimal outcome will never be possible with
the wrong model.) Nevertheless, governance is not the only element determining port
performance. This is also linked to the efficiency and effectiveness of the port logistics
chains (Brooks (2004), Brooks and Pallis (2008), Verhoeven (2011), Borges Vieira et al.
(2014). The lack of an active port policy, a poor statement of the goals, the simultan-
eous development of additional policies with a negative impact on port outcome or
merely an inadequate decision could also deliver an unexpected result (Sanchez and
Pinto 2015).
Baltazar and Brooks (2001) suggest that port outcome depends on the context. It is
known that an inadequate configuration of the port governance model4 can lead to
troubles in the post-devolution period (Brooks and Pallis 2008). However, despite the
relevance of the governance-outcome relationship, there is scarce economic literature
going beyond the analysis of the structure and the port functions (Borges Vieira
et al. 2014).
In order to fill this gap and deepen the assessment of the governance, Borges Vieira
et al. (2014) propose the analysis of port governance by separating its different dimen-
sions. Namely: i) the structure, identifying its components and evaluating its effective-
ness and evolution over time; ii) the actions, taking into account the degree of
coordination among them at both flows and agents levels; and iii) the elements,
through the analysis of the evolution of their coordination degree and the efficiency on
the management of flows and information. Their hypothesis is that the port governance
model is adequate when it favours the players' integration and increases the efficiency.
The complexity of port governance has increased over time. During the last three de-
cades and independently of the countries’ development level, there has been a progres-
sive port devolution process, both through the transference of competences to minor
administration levels and through the increase in the participation of the private sector.
Likewise, the rules operating in the maritime transport sector are being standardized,
services are been homogenized, and economic agents are concentrating on boosting
scale and agglomeration economies. Additionally, maritime flows increase introduces
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turn of empty containers; ii) the congestion of some ports and facilities; and iii) the ne-
cessity of a bigger budget to face infrastructure improvements (González Laxe 2008).
Because of all these changes, port activity goes beyond the five basic activities identi-
fied by the UNCTAD in 1992. Namely: i) cargo planning; ii) its storage; iii) its receipt
and delivery; iv) ship operations; and v) quay operations. As Drewe and Janssen (1996)
(among others) highlighted, ports became nodes in logistics chains. That implies new
challenges for the port governance. New and more specialised services integrated in
complex logistics chains are expected. Following Verhoeven (2009), that means port
managers ought to promote: i) a sustainable development of port activity; ii) the port’s
integration into logistic chains; and iii) the development of market strategies for port
management. Vanoutrive (2012) considers that there are basically three challenges to
port governance: firstly, he suggests that managers must be able to exert influence on
the ports. As the ports shift from places to nodes in logistic chains, it is increasingly
difficult to exert that influence because the management of those chains surpasses their
competencies. Secondly, there are no citizens in the ports. Therefore, there is a lack of
agents upon which to exert influence. Thirdly, the environmental impact of port activ-
ity must be taken into account.
The reforms conducted in port governance follow different paths, although the main
challenges and objectives of the ports today are very similar all around the world. Ng
and Pallis (2010) drew that conclusion based on the important differences they found
among port governance practices conducted in a group of countries. These authors jus-
tified those differences because of the observed asymmetries among the countries at
the institutional level. Specifically, they found that the role of the ports varies according
to the political tradition of each country. In all of the cases, economic agents linked to
the maritime sector were included in the management models (although with different
degrees of engagement), and a larger financial autonomy was conceded to the ports.
However, the new mechanisms can be more closely related to the public administration
or to the market depending on the country. The same conclusion can be drawn in the
case of the EU. The diversity of rules makes it impossible to identify a European model
per se, although the landlord framework is by far the most extended (see Verhoeven
(2009) for a revision of the impact of the EU rules on port governance.)
In general terms, it can be concluded that the broadly imposed model assumes the
principles of the market economy and realises that the traffic is increasingly concen-
trated around a small number of ports. Likewise, the devolution processes have chan-
ged the balance between the public and the private sector in port management.
Nevertheless, changes undergone have not been the same and the models imposed dif-
fer among them (Debrie et al. 2013). This paper emphasises these statements by focus-
ing on the Latin countries but grouping them by continent: Europe vs South America.
Cases analysis
In both Southern Europe and South America, port governance has changed signifi-
cantly in recent years. Those changes can be examined in two sets: the first is related
to external reasons (it intends to answer the question “why should port governance
have changed?”), and the second one to the purpose of port reforms (it intends to an-
swer the question “why did port reform take place?”).
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the following matters: a) a greater economic globalization of commercial transactions
that brought along a substantial shift with respect to the strategic behaviour of the pri-
vate and public agents participating in the logistics chain; b) a change in the maritime
industry that implied a commitment to containers, and to larger and more competitive
vessels; as well as a substantial change in the strategies of companies regarding the con-
stitution of new maritime alliances; c) a new port hierarchy stemmed from the appear-
ance of hub ports that shows the new conditions put together by the global economy
which impact the maritime and port industries.
The second set (“the actual changes”) shows the original reform objectives: a) putting
saturated public-sector ports back on a viable footing5; b) solving the pre-existing ser-
ious problem of port inefficiency; c) reducing fiscal burden coming from ports6; d)
introducing private-sector capital and business management to create a port services
industry that emphasizes market demands and competition. The solution proposed was
the application of antimonopoly regimes to ensure that no group within the port com-
munity is able to insulate itself from market forces and extract monopoly rents; e) im-
proving external trade competitiveness7; f ) dealing with the labour problems, low
productivity and high costs that existed in almost all ports. This set of changes is
mainly, but not exclusively, related to South America cases.
In Latin America, private income was intended to be co-ordinated with a public
action different from the previous one. In this sense, “to promote private-sector in-
volvement in port services and port facilities, a central government must adopt a
market-oriented institutional framework which reassigns operational, planning and ad-
ministrative functions among public-sector agencies and private interests, in order to
ensure that dominant port groups cannot distort the commercial environment in which
trade relations take place” (UNCTAD, 1992). The major elements of such a framework
included statutory authority for private participation, deregulation, decentralization, an
antimonopoly regime and a public-sector agency that balances competing interests to
ensure that no one group can utilize market mechanisms to obtain a monopoly pos-
ition. The statutory authority should clearly define standards for the approval of
private-sector proposals and establish a strong presumption that increased participation
will benefit the nation through increased competition, in order to avoid the endless
problems and delays of trying to satisfy imprecise regulatory requirements.
In a similar manner, these circumstances stirred the dynamic of a distribution of du-
ties between the public and private sectors among the Southern European countries
under analysis thus bringing about a substantial change in port governance.
Where once the model presented a prominent public sector presence (be it of state,
regional o local origin); now, port models have become more complex. The private sec-
tor is gradually gathering presence in management, while economic, social and institu-
tional agencies have increased participation in decision-making.
An augmented international competition, the consolidation of global supply chains
and the increased efficiency and quality of port services demand new immediate
responses.
As the investment needed to undertake new initiatives in infrastructure, equipment
and facilities fails to be taken on by governments or public authorities, some ports and
port institutions face an evident dilemma. In the first place, some ports encounter an
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functioning of port operations that hinder efficient maintenance. Such situations pre-
vent ports from responding to the highly competitive international atmosphere. In cer-
tain circumstances, liberalization dynamic starts to take form. Similarly, as functioning
ports and their decision-making process fall inside centralizing frameworks, new under-
takings are aimed at the start-up of more decentralizing mechanisms, strengthened by
new shifts of power among port authorities. Finally, and as a third assumption, the bid
is placed on the creation and operation of agencies, entities or corporate organizations,
and of privatization dynamics, with the aim of achieving new capabilities of manage-
ment and liability.
This process can also be approached from the port-devolution perspective (Cullinane
and Song (2002), Brooks (2004), Baltazar and Brooks (2007)) of transferring duties from
the Administration and central government to other organisms or administrative en-
tities, be them public or private, in order to improve the ability to supervise, develop
participation, guarantee management transparency, or incorporate technological ad-
vances. As a whole, the content of port-devolution is part of a dynamic applied by cer-
tain governments with views on implementing new public management principles in
the areas of transport and the maritime-port sector. This means applying new eco-
nomic and commercial principles to governmental management, favouring stronger
liberalization and decentralization processes and answering to the conditions set by the
local environment.
Analysis of the mechanisms involved in governance reforms
In Southern Europe, the reform process gradually adjusted to a new international pano-
rama. Therefore they became governmental responses and, consequently, determina-
tions that lined up with the guidelines of a more competitive, global and open
environment, highly integrated in international networks. Meanwhile, in Latin America,
reforms followed the trend of a more or less generalised transformation of State
involvement in economy at the beginning of the 1990s, after the stimulus of the
Washington Consensus. Table 1 exhibits the timeline of the major reforms:
In order to carry out the analysis of governance evolution, a set of analytic categories
must be pinpointed. The authors have selected the previously identified cornerstones:
structure, actions and elements (where structure refers to the regulatory frame-
work; actions to the tools leading to coordination; and elements, to the agents and
flows.) It is also essential to differentiate between the port and the port authority
(socio-economic agents and the political bodies and port management.) In sum-
mary, the analysis examines the key elements for port governance in practice: the
institutions, the mechanisms and the processes. Tables 2 and 3 constitute the main
features of the changes in port governance that took place in both regions, following the
Vanoutrive (2012) model, coherent with analysed works (Brooks and Cullinane (2007),
Verhoeven and Vanoutrive (2012), Brooks (2004), González-Laxe (2013) and Sanchez and
Pinto (2015).
Discussion
The sequences and categories of reform dynamics respond to scales that differ regard-
ing i) private participation; ii) various levels of decentralization; iii) unequal advantages
Table 1 Timeline of port reforms






















2014 Arg-14 Ita-14 Por-14
2015
2016 Arg-16 Ita-16
Source: own development, based on each country’s national legislation
González Laxe et al. Journal of Shipping and Trade  (2016) 1:14 Page 9 of 20in the field of marketing and fees configuration; iv) diverse structures of
corporatization; v) dissimilar elements taken in order to compose the governance
model and vi) different mechanisms of contracts and duration of concession periods.
The several responses of the port systems in the “Latin countries” of Southern Europe
and South America bid on the landlord model, where port administration assumes
regulatory functions and controls the port supply, granting concessions on port oper-
ation and workforce to the private sector, shaping governance schemes in accordance
with the Landlord model.
The first approach to the contents of Tables 2 and 3 has allowed for the formation of
new questions about the meaning of governance and the landlord model. The defin-
ition of governance is insufficient, especially within the port environment. In this con-
text, various schemes lead to different levels, such as the port, the port authorities or
the logistics chain. The central role of the ports calls for a unified governance that will
lead the way for synergies and new modes of authority enforcement and resolution of
controversies.
Figure 1 shows a variation of the reasons that generate a change in the reforms. The
grey sections are those originally studied by Brooks and Cullinane (2007). Afterwards,
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González Laxe et al. Journal of Shipping and Trade  (2016) 1:14 Page 15 of 20governance model. These are clearly related to the evolution of time and institutions
rather than to a foundational situation, such as proposed by the original scheme that
dates back 25 years. For example, this occurs when the decision is taken to move from
straightforward port operation and regulatory action to public policy design and action
focused on serving the common interests of society. This shift in the orientation of
public policies, combined with technological change and the trade boost from
globalization, creates a set of opportunities for change in processes and strategies that
can lead to a programme of reforms and a shift to a new governance.
Indeed, Brooks and Cullinane begin by pointing out that the dynamics of port devel-
opment themselves can yield new opportunities for improvement from the govern-
ments. It is important to stress, however, that other elements can also feed back into
the process and once again can drive a programme of reforms leading for a new gov-
ernance. These type of new elements are present in both Southern Europe and South
America. Some of the main drivers are as follows:
 The interaction of ever-advancing trade and globalization with technological
change, as this produces feedback that can push traditional ports to the edge of
their expansion capacity.
 Partial attainment of the original objectives, which can prompt the consideration of
what new goals might be needed, taking advantage of lessons learned and new
instruments that were not part of the original design.
 Changes in the market (and in technology), lack or excess of competition and shifts
in bargaining power between actors within the market that can result in monopsonies
or oligopsonies (the original objectives included the prevention of monopolies but not
of monopsonies).
As time passes, a governance model may be called into question because of its
intrinsic characteristics or because of the results achieved, in the light of various
considerations.
Having analysed the literature on the matter, and several experiences, it becomes evi-
dent that the concepts of governance and landlord require more debate in order to
reach a more comprehensive definition and its implementation. The cases analysed in
this paper, coinciding with a broad pre-existing literature, clearly show that despite the
basic definitions of traditional governance models (service, tool, private and landlord),
the different applications observed in each port (and within a country) hinder the un-
equivocal distinction of the application of each one in a "pure" manner.
“The most striking feature to emerge from our analysis of national situations is the
persistence of a hybrid model which combines aspects of the market-based landlord port
model with aspects of the more classical tool port model.” (Debrie 2010, page 8). Con-
sistently, when analysing governance models in 42 ports from 13 countries around the
world, including 3 out of the 8 countries analysed in this paper, Brooks and Cullinane
(2007) have identified the existence of multiple strategic objectives that can be managed
and monitored in a wide variety of ways. It is worth noting that in the analysed sample,
most case ports had been identified under a landlord model. Said study covered aspects
such as the objectives behind governance models, ways to deliver services such as
cargo-handling, chandlery, on-dock storage, container terminal operations, anchorage,
González Laxe et al. Journal of Shipping and Trade  (2016) 1:14 Page 16 of 20port information, management of vessel traffic, container maintenance, towage, secur-
ity, waste disposal, pilotage, customs and other administrative services, general market-
ing of the port, stevedoring labour hiring, and other governmental duties such as
regulation, planning, and investment, among others. The authors concluded that the
traditional port governance models identified by “Baird (2000) and the World Bank
(undated) are oversimplified, cannot be validated, and do not reflect the hodgepodge of
‘infinite variety’ implemented in today’s highly competitive port environment” (Brooks
and Cullinane 2007, page 434).
Another view to be examined is the concept of governance that has often been re-
stricted, at the legal and functional levels, to the inside of ports, and tied to regulations
that were designed in times when port activities were much simpler (UNCTAD type).
Meanwhile, a wider, comprehensive and unified logistics concept has replaced the older
concept of services that are provided separately from the transport and distribution
chain, thus imposing the necessity to grant efficiency and efficacy to the logistics chain
as a whole (Sanchez and Pinto 2015).
The question now arises as to whether this governance still in place in each country,
particularly in Latin America, is capable of assuming the challenge of influencing an ex-
tended logistics chain. Indeed, the changes that took place in Argentina and Brazil
followed modifications in the original proposal, but not an adjustment to a shifting envir-
onment. In the case of Argentina, post-2012 modifications relate to the institutional
organization and coordination at the State level, turning the sector into a web of dis-
jointed organisms controlled by different Ministries. The first changes applied in 2016
have started to untangle the situation, a still ongoing process. As for Brazil, the situation
is slightly different. The latest modifications sought to expand port infrastructure,
modernize port administration, stimulate private investment and improve competitive-
ness, easing the way for new operators. To this end, the legislation puts an end to a long-
dated distinction between own cargo (which originally posed a limitation on TUPs8) and
third-party cargo, as well as lifting the restrictions on the development of new terminals
as long as they belong to the common area of the port. Despite these major changes,
which still need to be revised, it should be noted that the reform intended only to solve a
long-standing issue, but did not entirely address the new challenges of governance.
These circumstances pose an enormous challenge. As previously mentioned,
Vanoutrive (2012) identifies three issues: i) the need for the governing entity to exert
control over the governed entity, the latter of which now encompasses much more than
just port facilities; ii) the lack of citizens over whom to exercise governance; and iii) the
environmental impact. In addition to all of this comes institutional complexity, which
deepens the diversity of models and the results of governance (Ng and Pallis 2010).
The motivation in Latin America to apply reforms was common to almost every
country: each country’s search for an enhanced competitiveness in international mar-
kets, associated with the need for a better transportation network. The port system was
in need of drastic changes, among which stood the need to reformulate roles and set
clear rules for all parties involved. The aim was to facilitate the growth and competi-
tiveness of economy and trade, by decentralizing, deregulating and privatizing, thus
privileging economic efficiency. In the case of Southern Europe, although the concerns
were similar, a reform in transport policies had already been set in motion. Conse-
quently, as countries authorise new dispositions, the new role of the private initiative is
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making together with Port Authorities.) Furthermore, the European Commission is
currently including the private initiative in its resolutions, and proposes formulas
of “public-private partnership” in order to assume investments in infrastructure
and projects for new rail accesses into ports. Meanwhile, the consecutive disposi-
tions approved by Southern European Countries have enjoyed widespread support
from the sector; meaning, these decisions were adapted after a sustained joint ini-
tiative on the part of public and private agents.
All things considered, it is possible to say that ports in Southern European countries
have plunged head into an adaptation of their port governance. In Latin America, how-
ever, recent changes denote a greater tendency to reinforce the bases of original reforms,
taking the port environment as the sole core of governance (save for a slight exception in
Peru). Twenty-five years later, Latin America is in need of a revision of its port govern-
ance, adopting a less sectoral and more comprehensive consideration of the chain.
Several of the original objectives of the reforms were fulfilled (at least partially), while
others have emerged following the evolution of the markets. By consulting Fig. 1 it can
be deduced that introducing a reform that adapts governance to the new context would
be fitting. For instance, regarding the role of port authorities in Latin America, its ap-
proach is similar to that of Southern Europe countries, i.e. closer to the functions of a
regulator and promoter. Even so, the reforms that took place over the past five years in
Southern Europe have eased the insertion of the ports into the logistics chain, while in
South America this remains a pending matter.
Generally speaking, Southern Europe has shown a higher capability of adaptation to
change than Latin America, where it would be particularly convenient to embark on a
revision of port governance through a more comprehensive and sustainable view.
Conclusions
Taking the literature into account, and in light of revised experiences, it is possible to
suggest that port governance is the governance of the system of relationships and be-
haviours that define the functioning of a port in the context of a logistics chain. Port
governance is an ensemble of mechanisms, processes and rules through which the au-
thority over said activity is exercised, and refers to the behaviour of institutions being
influenced by a varied set of agents and rules. In other words, governance may be seen
as the decision-making process and the process through which such decisions are ei-
ther implemented or not, being conditioned by the set of mechanisms, procedures and
rules established by institutions, both formally and informally.
Considering the reviewed cases, it is possible to conclude that current port govern-
ance in Latin America is tied to the definition provided by UNCTAD in 1992; mean-
while countries in Southern Europe have begun to shift towards the role described by
Drewe and Janssen (1996). In both cases, reforms have aided the modernization process
of ports, the influx of private capital, the standardization of public-private association,
the increase in productivity, and the adoption of technical standards of operation that
allow for the delivery of more or less universal port services. However, aspects such as
the relationship with the workforce, the establishment of decision-making mechanisms
for investment and capacity expansion, or the type of port authority, are yet to be
sorted out. The main conclusions resulting from the analysed cases are as follows:
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to form the basis of port governance in Latin America, and their adaptability to
change has proved to be lower than in the case of Europe.
 There has been increased action in the European cases than in the Latin American
cases to adapt ports (and, consequently, their governance) to the needs of an
enhanced logistics chain.
 An unequal rhythm of port governance adaptation to contextual changes requires
that the reform be considered an ongoing process.
 A profound revision of port governance would be advisable, particularly in South
America, in order to adapt to changes and new challenges.
 It is essential to elaborate a common definition of port governance. It is also
essential to develop further studies on the extent of the term ‘landlord’, taking into
consideration how it is merely the initial definition of public property and private
exploitation that are common to the analysed cases, while there exists a large
variety in the remaining components of governance and the relationship between
State and individuals in port activity.
The definition of ‘landlord model’ should indeed be re-examined, given the existence
of as many landlord models as cases analysed. The subsequent discussion concerns the
validity of the current landlord system and its capacity to adjust. Based on the cases
analysed, it is possible to conclude that current port governance in Latin America is in
need of a renewal, since the current base concepts are clearly related to old definitions
(like UNCTAD in 1992) and not linked to a modern concept of the role of ports and
the connection with the productive and logistics chains, both at the national and global
level. A similar reconsideration would be advisable for port governance within the
framework of an integral and sustainable policy. It is necessary to adopt a more com-
prehensive perspective of port development and operation, in order to enhance effi-
ciency throughout the logistics chain, including both expanding investments and
improving productivity and connectivity.
In summary, Southern Europe has shown a higher capability of adapting to change than
Latin America. The analysed Southern European countries showed no concern regarding
the contents of the definition of governance, taken as an academic or merely administra-
tive concept. Thus, diverse port systems coexist, with organizational structures that differ
in levels of participation as well as in regards to decision-making. Likewise, different fi-
nancing models and services provision models coexist as well, as a consequence of dis-
similar stakes on governance. However, a characteristic common to port systems in
Southern Europe continues to be the acceptance of changes, that is, non-dependency on
traditional institutional instances (path dependence). On the contrary, in the case of the
Latin American countries analysed, it is possible to observe an adjustment to objectives
previously set by public policies at the onset of the process (early 1990s), and a gradual
lack of adaptation to changes that took place in the port environment. Ultimately, the fact
that there is a difference between adaptation rhythms supports the idea that port govern-
ance is not a state as much as it is a dynamic process, in continuous evolution, intended
to answer to the changing conditions of the environment.
The analysed reforms both in South America and Southern Europe are the result of
decisions made by law-makers and government officials but also pressure by private
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and achieve a better integration into global supply chains. To this end, it is vital to
reach a thorough understanding of the forms that port governance takes, so it can be
perfected with views on fulfilling the stated objectives.
Finally, some relevant aspects could not be considered in this paper, due to its quali-
tative nature. For instance, authors have recognized one of those being the relationship
between the governance structure and the outcomes, in quantitative terms, the time lag
between reforms and the effective change of port governance and the relationship be-
tween reforms, governance and institutions, among others. Those matters should form
part of future research.
Endnotes
1Regarding Latin America, that evolution provided two different models of port gov-
ernance: models 1.0 and 2.0 (see Sanchez and Pinto 2015.)
2For a deeper knowledge of the effect of the legal proposals in port governance, see
(Pallis 2007).
3Certainly, there is a feedback between the governance model and its corresponding
outcome.
4The variety of the actually existing port governance models surpasses the basic the-
oretical models.
5The collapse was due to a period of insufficient investment, and internal
organization and market issues.
6“For many years, port deficits were considered of minimal importance and a matter
that could be corrected with larger budget allocations or simply by raising charges.
However, such increases for nations which have adopted export-oriented macroeco-
nomic policies will ultimately affect the price of both exports and imports” (ECLAC
1992).
7“In the last decade of the twentieth century, governments face a fundamental choice:
either they identify and define appropriate roles for the public and private sectors in
ports vis-à-vis international trade or accept a reduction in the competitiveness of their
exports in world markets, a contraction in foreign exchange receipts, a decline in do-
mestic investments and a higher level of national unemployment” (ECLAC 1992).
8Private Use Terminals (from Portuguese Terminais de Uso Privado).
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